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CASE: COMMENTS
not, it will be declared non-existent.19 A declaratory judgment was
refused in Riverbank Improvement Co. v. Chadwick," as taking "private
property for private use" contrary to the Bill of Rights,m and in
Strong v. Shatto, on the ground that a change in neighborhood did
not relieve from the contractual obligation imposed by the restriction.
When, however, the restriction is no longer of practical benefit, the
better view seems to be that equity will remove it as a cloud on the
plaintiff's title. -? As it clearly appeared in the instant case that the
purpose for which the restriction was imposed had been defeated, the
court reaches the proper result. I MLRVIN Twcn
CONFLICT OF LAWS-TORTS-SUIT IN A FOREIGN COURT ON
AN OBLIGATION CREATED BY THE LAW OF THE
PLACE OF TORT
Defendant and his wife were citizens of New York. 'While the
wife was vacationing in Florida without her husband she assaulted the
plaintiff. Suit was brought by the plaintiff in New York where she
seeks to enforce liability against the defendant husband on the ground
that in Florida, where the tort occurred, a husband is liable for his
wife's torts.' Defendant moved that the complaint be dismissed because
under the New York law a husband is not liable for the separate torts
of his wife.2 Held: Complaint dismissed. The law of New York was
applied and the husband was not liable for the tort of his wife. Sieg-
rnan v. Meyer, 100 F. (2d) 367 (1938).
In deciding the case Judge Hand announced his theory of the
conflict of laws to be: "Strictly speaking, it is impossible for a court to
enforce a liability except one created by the law of the state in which
it sits. That state may take for its model a liability created by another
1 Equity really can have little discretion in the type of remedy.
See note 11, supra. If there is a binding restriction, it constitutes a
property right which a court has no authority to take for private use.
If there is no binding restriction, there is nothing. The only discretion
left to the court lies in determining whether there exists a valid
restriction.
"228 Mass. 243, 117 N. E. 244 (1917).
The Massachusetts statute allowing the removal of a covenant by
the court where there had been a change in the neighborhood, and pro-
viding that the defendant be paid for any loss caused by the removal
was held invalid.
"145 Cal. App. 29, 187 Pac. 159 (1920).
21icArthur v. Hood Rubber Co., 221 Mass. 372, 109 N. E. 162 (1915);
Burton v. Moline Properties, Inc., 121 Fla. 683, 164 So. 551 (1935).
This view is in accord with that expressed by Pound that when the pur-
pose of the restriction has failed of accomplishment there is "nothing
left to protect by injunction." Supra, note 13 at 821.
1Meek v. Johnson, 85 Fla. 248, 95 So. 670 (1923); Greene v. Miller,
102 Fla. 767, 136 So. 532 (1931).
2 N. Y. Domestic Relations Law sec. 57, Strubing v. Mahar, 46 App.
Div. 409, 61 N. Y. Supp. 799 (1899); Tanzer v. Read, 160 App. Div.
584, 145 N. Y. Supp. 708 (1914).
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
state, merely because the other state creates it .. . but the liability
enforced is the creature of its own will: its law of the conflict of laws
alone will determine when it will fashion a liability after the foreign
liability.'  This theory, which finds support with some writers, 4 is
based on the territorial theory of Judge Story and reasons that each
state is a sovereign within itself and that the laws of one state can have
no effect in any other state. The writers argue that in each case the
ultimate power of choice as to what law it shall apply lies with the
court invoked for the enforcement of the alleged right, and that as
long as sovereign states exist, with no superior court to enforce the
rules of the conflict of laws, this must necessarily be the rule.
The rule of conflict of laws generally adopted is that the law of the
place of the tort shall determine whether there is any liability on the
part of the defendant.5 Justice Cardozo sets the theory of this rule out
in Loucks v. Standard Oil of N. Y. where he says, "a tort committed In
one state creates a right of action which may be sued upon in another
state unless public policy forbids .... The sovereign may in its discre-
tion refuse its aid to the foreign right. From this it has been an easy
step to the conclusion that a like freedom of choice has been confided
to the courts. But that, of course, is a false view. The courts are not
free to refuse to enforce a foreign right at the pleasure of the judges,
to suit their individual notion of expediency or fairness. They do not
close their doors, unless help would violate some fundamental principle
of justice, some prevalent conception of good morals, or some deep-
rooted conception of the common weal".' This conception of the con-
flict of laws, called the "vested rights"8 theory, is based on the idea
3100 F. (2d) 367 (1938). For earlier cases in which Judge Hand
states the same theory as in the principle case see Guinness v. Miller,
291 Fed. 769 (1923); The James McGee, 300 Fed. 93 (1924); Direction
Der Disconto-Gesellschaft v. United Steel Corp., 300 Fed. 741 (1924).4 Cook, The Logical and Legal Basis of the Conflict of Laws (1924)
33 Y. L. J. 457; Lorenzen, Tort Liability and the Conflict of Laws
(1931) 47 L. Q. R. 483. (Lorenzen believes that as a practical matter
this is the only view to take.)
5Northern Pac. R. R. Co. v. Babcock, 154 U. S. 190 (1894); Stewart
v. B. and 0. R. Co., 168 U. S. 445 (1897); Slater v. Mexican National
R. R., 194 U. S. 120 (1904); A. & T. and Sante Fe R. Co. v. Sowers, 213
U. S. 55 (1909); Cuba R. R. v. Crosby, 222 U. S. 473 (1911); Walsh v.
N. Y. and N. E. R. Co, 160 Mass. 571, 36 N. E. 584 (1894); Loucks v.
Standard Oil Co., 224 N. Y. 99, 120 N. E. 198 (1918); Buckeye v. Buck-
eye, 203 Wis. 248, 234 N. W. 242 (1931); Beale, Treatise on Conflict of
Laws (1935) sec. 378.2; Restatement; Conflict of Laws (1934) sec. 379.
0224 N. Y. 99, 120 N. E. 198 (1918).
7And see Judge Holmes in Cuba -R. R. v. Crosby, 222 U. S. 473
(1911), where he says, "But when an action is brought upon a cause
arising outside of the jurisdiction it always should be borne in mind
that the duty of the court is not to administer its notion of justice but
to enforce an obligation which has been created by a different law.
The law of the forum is material only in setting a limit of policy
beyond which such obligations are not enforced there."
8 Stumberg, Conflict of Laws: Foreign Created Rights (1930) 8
Tex. L. R. 173 at 179.
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that the law of the place of the tort gives a vested right to the wronged
person to have his wrong redressed; and that this right creates a corre-
sponding obligation against the person liable for the wrong which fol-
lows him and may be enforced wherever he can be found. The most
serious defect in this rule is that if the court of suit refuses to enforce
a tort liability created in the state where the tort happened nothing
can be done to correct thisY
It is submitted that Cardozo's conception of the conflict of laws is
the one most desirable in the United States. The state has ceased to be
an entity in the United States in our modern social and business lives.
This is a result of the increased speed and ease with which we are able
to move from one state to another by rail, automobile or airplane.
Therefore, the people of one state are often found doing business in a
second state, or, as in the principle case, in the second state for pleas-
ure; and this in turn gives rise to more and more situations in which
the law of one state is sought to be enforced in another. Since the
above is true the courts should realize that people are likely to come
before them seeking to enforce a right created by another state, and,
they should be ready and willing to enforce those rights as a matter of
expediency. Also, since the states are becoming more of a unity in
business matters, as a logical corollary, the laws of one state should
be easily enforceable in the others. Thirdly, it is submitted that since
the court of suit can not create an obligation when none exists in the
state where the acts complained of took place,' it should not be per-
mitted to refuse to enforce an obligation created in the state where the
tort arose.
Despite the fact that Judge Hand may have adopted the wrong
theory of the conflict of laws in the principle case the decision can be
sustained on other well recognized principles of conflicts. First, it can
be argued that in this particular case the defendant was never in the
state of Florida, and therefore the laws of Florida should not apply to
him. This reasoning does not violate the theory of the conflict of laws
just sanctioned because it is fundamental as a part of that theory that
the state where the tort occurred must have personal jurisdiction over
the person charged with the commission of the tort? Since the defend-
ant was never in Florida he should be subject only to the laws of the
state of New York.
In Florida when a wife commits a tort her husband is joined in the
1 It has been urged that if the liability sought to be enforced arose
under the statute of the state in which the acts took place it would
be in violation of the "full faith and credit" clause of the Constitution
not to recognize the obligation so created. Note (1935) 44 Y. L. J. 158
at 160. It would not seem possible to urge this theory where the obliga-
tion sought to be enforced arose under the common law of the state
where the acts complained of took place.
"American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U. S. 347 (1908);
Salimoff and Co. v. Standard Oil Co. of N. Y., 262 N. Y. 220, 136 N. E.
679 (1933).
11 Restatement, Conflict of Laws (1934) sec. 47, 65.
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suit against her simply because in that state the common-law dis-
abilities of a married woman still exist and she can not be sued' alone.
Therefore, the joinder of the husband with his wife in a suit for a tort
committed by her is a procedural matter." It is a well recognized
rule of conflicts that as regards procedural matters, such as pleadings,
parties and evidence, the law of the place of the suit governs." In New
York the procedural disabilities of a wife have been removed and she
can be sued alone, so when the procedural law of New York is applied
to the facts of the principal case it at once appears that it was proper
to dismiss the complaint against the husband.
It might also be argued that since New York has a statute prevent-
ing the enforcement of such a liability as presented here it would be
against the sound public policy of the state, as expressed by the statute,
to enforce the liability created in Florida. New York has previously
held that where the suit was based on a death statute of the state
where the tort occurred and New York had a statute preventing such
suits, it would violate the strong public policy of the state to enforce
this type of liability created in another state." The majority rule,
however, is that even though there is a statute in the state preventing
the liability sought to be enforced, the court will enforce the liability
as created by the law of the other state unless to do so would shock the
morals of the people and violate some established and important policy
of the state."
1220 A. L. R. 529; Prentis v. Paisley, 25 Fla- 927, 7 So. 56 (1S89):
"His (the husband's) liability for her tort is the result of the mere fact
that by the common-law rules a suit cannot be maintained against the
wife alone during coverture. If, before or pending the action, she
died, the right of action against him fails"; Graham v. Tucker, 56 Fla.
307, 47 So. 563 (1908); Greene v. Miller, 102 Fla. 767, 136 So. 532
(1931). In an excellent note in 34 Y. L. J. 543 (1925) the historical
background for compelling the husband to be joined in suits against
his wife is given. The writer there shows that the original reasons for
the rule are not applicable today, but he submitted that so long as a
wife remains financially unable to pay judgments against her a sub-
stantive right of action should be had against the husband. This
is the only reason advanced for saying that the liability of a husband
In this type of case is any more than a holdover from the early days of
procedure when a wife could not be sued alone. See also Note (1934)
83 U. of Pa. L. R. 66; Note (1936) 41 Dick. L. R. 55; Note (1932) 18
Iowa L. R. 30. Cf. Roberson v. Queen, 87 Tenn. 445, 11 S. W. 38 (1889).
13 Prichard v. Norton, 106 U. S. 124 (1882); Central Vt. R. Co. v.
White, 238 U. S. 507 (1915); Chase v. Ormsby, 65 F. (2d) 521 (1933);
Perkins v. Great Central Transportation Corp., 262 Mich. 616, 247 N. W.
759 (1933).
"Herzog v. Stern, 148 Misc. 25, 265 N. Y. Supp. 72 (1933). See also
Shore Acres Properties Inc. v. Morgan, 44 Ga. App. 128, 160 S. E. 705
(1931).
"Walworth v. Harris, 129 U. S. 355 (1888); Lauria v. Du Pont
Co., 241 Fed. 678 (1917); Caine v. St. Louis and Sante Fe R. Co., 209
Ala. 181, 95 So. 876 (1923); Henning v. Hill, 80 Ind. App. 363, 141
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It is submitted that Judge Hand reached a correct result in the
principle case but that in doing so he adopted and sanctioned the
incorrect theory of the conflict of laws. It would seem that the theory
of Justice Cardozo would, if allowed, reach a more desirable result in
the normal case involving conflict of laws. JAMEs D. ALLzN
N. E. 66 (1923); Walsh v. N. Y. and N. E. R. Co., 160 Mass, 571, 36
N. E. 584 (1894); In re Miller's Estate, 239 Mich. 455, 214 N. W. 428
(1927); Mt. Ida School for Girls v. Rood, 253 Mich. 482, 235 N. W. 227
(1931); Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 224 N. Y. 99, 120 N. E. 198 (1918).
